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INTRODUCTION 
The Russian Army prior to 1918 was composed prima¬ 
rily of peasants who lacked adequate training in the use 
of weapons and discipline. 
Lenin saw the need for organizing an army to protect 
the new Bolshevik government and to help further spread 
Communism throughout the world. Although Lenin gave the 
decree establishing the new army, Trotsky did the real 
work of organizing, training, disciplining and indoctri¬ 
nating the Red Army, for this reason he is often called 
"the Father of the Russian Army." Although Trotsky 
admittedly knew little about military affairs, he obtained 
assistance from his 'military specialists,' who were 
former tsarist officers. For using these former tsarist 
officers, Trotsky received open opposition and criticism 
from the Bolshevik leaders. 
This study will analyze the successes and failures 
that the Red Army incurred along with the methods employed 
by Trotsky and his 'military specialists’ in organizing 
and training the Red Army of Workers and Peasants (RKKA). 
Students in Russian history classes are often taught 
about the Russian's use of the "scortched earth plan" and 
how successful it was in stopping Napoleon and later Hitler 
but the ability and hardships that the Red Army encountered 
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in its early history is not emphasized. 
Studying the history of a revolutionary government's 
ability to establish an effective army in a time of world 
crisis, World War I, and during a period of civil war 
should be of interest to any student curious about how a 
new and weak government can protect itself from external 
interventions and internal reaction. 
The problem of creating a revolutionary army will 
be approached topically. The central focus will be on 
Trotsky and his contributions to the Red Army of Workers 
and Peasants. Specifically this thesis will examine the 
military tactics, political control, and the means of 
obtaining and disciplining soldiers for the Red Army. This 
study will analyze Trotsky's organizational tactics in the 
Red Army, how the Bolshevik government erected the Red Army 
and how the Red Cell was used and its effect on the sol¬ 
diers. 
The limitations of this study will center around my 
inability to read Russian which causes me to rely more on 
secondary sources and the fact that primary sources on this 
topic are relatively scarce in this area. 
In scope this paper will cover the military history 
of the Red Army from 1918 to 1922. The importance of these 
dates is that in 1918 the Red Army of Workers and Peasants 
was created; and in 1922 the Red Army had defeated its 
major domestic and foreign enemies and had assumed its 
basic organizational structure. 
CHAPTER I 
THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE RED ARMY 
In the beginning of 1918 the Russians were still 
engaged in a war with the Germans. The Russian Army, such 
as it was, was primarily a volunteer army, consisting of a 
large percentage of peasants, Letts, Chinese, Finns—and, 
in Siberia, many prisoners of war of the German coalition 
joined the Red Army.l The army was afflicted with a 
morale problem due to the merciless defeats it suffered 
at the hands of the Germans. The quality of the army was 
unsatisfactory, it lacked centralization, discipline and 
adequately trained soldiers and officers. 
Lenin saw the need for a powerful army, not only for 
the defense of his infant regime but for the purpose of 
world revolution. On January 28, 1918, Lenin signed the 
decree that brought into existence the Workers and Peasants 
Army (RKKA).2 The official birthday of the Soviet Army, 
however, is February 23, 19183 because it was on that day 
^■Michael Berchin and Eliahu Ben-Horin, The Red Army 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1942), pp. 45-46. 
2Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and Communist 
Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 38. 
3Malcolm Mackintosh, Juggernaut (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 20. 
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that one unit of the Red Guards was successful in inflict¬ 
ing a check on a German column marching on Petrograd. 
Leon Trotsky resigned the post of Foreign Commissar 
after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, March 
1918. Later Trotsky was made Commissar of War, this 
appointment was not unanimously approved within the Bol¬ 
shevik Party, as Trotsky . . . had already made enemies.4 
Trotsky, a man with little military knowledge, was the prime 
organizer of the Red Army. He was also given the post of 
chairman of the Revolutionary War Council.5 Trotsky wrote 
that the Soviets' task was to create an army of workers 
and small peasants to give it compulsory military training 
without forcing it into barracks and in doing this to main¬ 
tain, as far as possible, conditions which shall be in 
harmony with the working conditions of the laboring popu¬ 
lation. ^ 
Radek related that Trotsky, when he became Commissar 
of War, had read only a few books on military affairs, 
Jaurès' L'Armee Nouvelle, a large History of War by Schulz, 
a German Socialist, and Franz Mehring's writings on 
^Edgar O'Ballance, The Red Army; A Short History 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 39. 
^Sometimes referred to as the Revolutionary Military 
Council. 
^Leon Trotsky, "Creating the Russian Communist Party," 
Current History Magazine of the New York Times. November, 
1919, pp. 310-312. 
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Frederick the Great.7 Trotsky was also familiar, along 
with Lenin, with the work of Clausewitz, the great Prussian 
strategist. Undoubtedly, Trotsky had very little theoret¬ 
ical or practical preparations to be Commissar of War? 
nevertheless, he made an outstanding contribution to the 
organizing of the Red Army and justly deserves the title 
of "Father of the Red Army of Workers and Peasants."8 
Indeed, the building of the Red Army owed more to Trotsky 
than to any other man.8 
Trotsky, with Lenin's approval, undertook to remove 
the destructive elements from the Red Army and to transform 
it into an efficient professional force. In carrying out 
this task he met with open opposition from many of his 
colleagues in the party, including Stalin, Voroshilov and 
Frunze. Trotsky reminded them that they had to tell the 
Russian workers and peasants to create self-discipline and 
strict discipline if they did not want to be under the heel 
of the German boot.-*-8 He admonished them that if they did 
not learn discipline from the Germans they would become 
a lost nation. 
The Party was divided on the role the Red Army would 
play. One side wanted it to be a truly "revolutionary" 
7Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 477. 
80'Ballance, Red Army, p. 39. 
8B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Red Army (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), p. 27. 
■*-®Berchin and Ben-Horin, Red Army, p. 46 
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army based on ideological tenets while the others wanted 
it to be a professional army unaffected by ideology. 
Those desiring a "revolutionary" army favored: 
1. A minimum of centralized control and maximum 
reliance on local party control for military 
units, a territorial militia. (That is to say, 
a territorial militia as opposed to standing 
professional cadres.) 
2. The abolition of rigid discipline, ranks and 
traditional military virtues and their replace¬ 
ment be a system in which commanders were elected 
and orders might be questioned. 
3. Voluntary recruitment as opposed to compulsory 
service. 
4. Local, rather than central control of Party 
organizations, and political organs in military 
units. 
5. Revolutionary military doctrine in place of 
orthodox strategy.il 
If the revolutionary military doctrine was adopted the 
revolutionary army would employ guerrilla tactics and 
abandon the conventional type of warfare that made use of 
the trench and the front lines. 
Those proponents of a professional army of standing 
cadres suggested that the control of the military be cen¬ 
tralized and operate according to traditional military 
strategic concepts, strict discipline and hierarchic 
organization. The Red Army, in its early years, was a 
compromise of the two views. Although it was gradually 
becoming an organization of professional cadres, it still 
retained several characteristics of the revolutionary army 
llRolkowicz, Soviet Military, p. 39. 
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idea.-*-2 These will be discussed later. 
Trotsky had proposed a plan of development for the 
military organism he was seeking to build. This plan had 
two parts; the first segment, the Party had to disregard 
ideological formulas and create a military force capable 
of fending off the counterrevolutionaries within and with¬ 
out the Soviet Union. The second part would take effect 
only after the first one had been successfully accomplished, 
then the Party would be free to create, at a more leisurely 
pace, a truly revolutionary army guided by ideological 
imperatives. 
In the early part of 1918, the Red Army was a volun¬ 
teer army, but this proved to be failure when only 106,000 
men enlisted during a two month period. Those men who had 
managed to escape conscription in the Imperial Army had no 
desire to change their views and join the Red Army. 
Although the final cout d'etat that put the Bolsheviks in 
power was made possible with the help of the peasants, 
the peasants had no love for the Bolshevik government who 
requisitioned their produce and gave them nothing in 
exchange.13 so why should they remove their Imperial 
uniforms or drop their plows to join the Red Army when 
they neither knew nor cared about the new Bolshevik plan 
for a strong and well disciplined Red Army? Because of 
this, on April 22, 1918 the government reintroduced 
12Ibid . 
13Hart, Red Army, p. 27. 
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compulsory military training and a week later a decree was 
issued abolishing the election of commanders in the armed 
forces.14 
Trotsky was determined to build the new Red Army on 
conventional lines, he accepted advice from ex-tsarist 
officers on military matters, much to the dislike of fellow 
revolutionaries, who prefered him using the so-called 
Marxist methods of waging war. On the advice of his 
'military specialists', General Vatsetis and General 
Brusilov, he enlisted the assistance of former Imperial 
officers to command in the Red Army. The Bolshevik 
leaders, including Lenin, opposed the idea because these 
officers were brought up with bourgeois ideals were felt 
by the party members, and in some cases needlessly so, to 
be suspects for a counterrevolution against the infant 
government. Trotsky told his opponents that even if it 
were possible to create an entirely new command in the 
course of several years by means of systematic work, there 
would yet be no fundamental reason to forego the help of 
members of the old command. It does not matter whether 
these are convinced supporters of the Soviet government 
or have been obliged by the forces of circumstances to 
offer their services.1^ At the end of June, 1918, the 
government introduced conscription which led to the recall 
to the colors of 22,000 former professional officers and 
1Mackintosh, Juggernaut, p. 21. 
1^Trotsky, "Communist Party," p. 311 
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nearly 130,00 former non-commissioned officers of the 
old army.16 According to the Associated Press, "All former 
non-commissioned officers of the Imperial Army within reach 
of the Bolshevik authorities in Petrograd were being 
forcibly mobilized according to advice received in 
Vladivostok. They desired officers in the Red Army, for 
which six classes of troops were reportedly called to the 
colors."!7 General Brusilov issued a written appeal to 
all former Russian army officers, whenever located, to 
join in a defense of the integrity of national Russia 
against any foreign effort to dismember the country.1® He 
was referring to the Polish threat. 
In order to ensure the loyalty of these professional 
officers to whom the name 'military specialists' was given, 
the government created the Institute of Political Commis¬ 
sars. The method was to attach a reliable Communist 
commissar to every staff and unit in the field with the 
task of ensuring the former officers did not desert or 
sabotage the army by issuing conterrevolutionary orders. 
The political commissars were ordered not to interfere in 
operational and military matters but they had to counter¬ 
sign all orders in order for them to be valid. Hostility 
toward the former officers was one of the troublesome 
^Mackintosh, Juggernaut, p. 21. 
l7"Made Officers by Force," New York Times. January 6, 
1919, p. 3. 
l®"Wrangel Wipes Out Red Calvary Corps," New York 
Times, July 7, 1920, p. 17. 
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features during the early years of the Red Army. The 
'military specialists' under went intimidation and ridi¬ 
cule from some commissars, some specialists were given to 
desertion by such tactics. The commissars fumed at Trotsky 
for employing the aid of the former officers. 
Trotsky employed another method of checking to make 
sure the former officers did not desert or plan counter¬ 
revolutions, he held their families captive. General and 
staff officers in the old Russian Army were compelled to 
serve the Bolsheviki by holding their families as hostages 
for the officers' conduct. Cases occurred of officers' 
families being placed under close arrest, the women being 
treated as badly as the men.19 In case an officer deserted, 
his family was shot and he was naturally killed if he was 
apprehended. This method was successful in discouraging 
many would be deserters. 
Along with the drafting of former officers into 
the Red Army the services of medical and veterinary 
officers were secured. Approximately 2,500 medical and 
veterinary officers were in the Red Army in 1918 and by 
April 1, 1919 the figure increased to 4,395.20 
The Bolsheviki placed advertisements in German medi¬ 
cal journals offering positions to German physicians and 
surgeons in the Red Army. Attractive pay, 5,000 marks 
19»Red Army Made Strong by Coerced Officers," New 
York Times. February 5, 1919, p. 1. 
20D. Pedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 51. 
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and the right of securing homesteads were promised them. 
Medical men were urged to enlist with volunteer troop 
units organized to fight for Bolshevism. 
The former non-commissioned officers were important 
to the Red Army because it did not have a chance to train 
its own officers corps so it had to depend on the aid of 
the former NCO's. By 1918, there were 128,169 former non¬ 
commissioned officers of the old army enrolled in the Red 
Army, as well as 9,713 of the lower medical and veterinary 
personnel.22 Trotsky's order of August 3, 1918, called 
the former NCO's to occupy command positions in the Red 
Army. Every former NCO in the ranks of the Red Army who 
volunteered, as well as those drafted into it, was given 
the position and privileges of a platoon commander, i.e., 
of a subaltern officer. This move was one that had a 
psychological effect on the NCO and served the Red Army 
by further securing their support. 
The peasants in the Red Army were not forgotten 
because Trotsky, as well as the Party, realized that the 
peasants comprised a large percentage of the army and the 
morale of this segment of the population was very low and 
the desertion rate increasing. This was countered by 
forming Red Cells; these cells consisted of between 
2^"Offer to German Surgeons," New York Times. 
September 4, 1919, p. 17. 
22White, Red Army, p. 51. 
23 Ibid., p. 52 
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fifteen to thirty trusted Party members in as many units 
as possible, whose task was to boost sagging morale and 
to breathe life and loyalty to the Bolshevik Party into 
the men.2^ This system proved to be quite effective. 
The Soviet Government's desire to communize the army 
took another form other than that of the Red Cells. Army 
barracks were transformed into schools for indoctrination 
on communism. Political commissars (policoms) and party 
committees in the units were placed in charge of the 
methodical dissemination of Communist propoganda in the 
barracks.25 This form of propoganda showed immediate 
results. Although there are no exact figures, it is safe 
to assume that there was a large increase in Party member¬ 
ship in the Red Army during this period. It would be 
wrong to assert that all of the members of the Red Army 
were true Communists. Some joined to gain advantages and 
privileges that would otherwise be denied them if they 
were not members of the party and some did not join the 
Party at all. 
The armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics consisted of the Red Army proper (infantry, 
cavalry, artillery, tank units, engineers, etc.) air and 
naval forces, units for coastal defense, border units and 
military units.2^ Under Trotsky's watchful assistance 
2^0'Ballance, Red Army, p. 41. 
^Berchin and Ben-Horin, Red Army, p. 54. 
26Ibid.. p. 56. 
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the Red Army began forming. Army units were formed almost 
27 everywhere, often using old army units as their core. 
In reorganizing the foot soldiers the Bolshevik 
leaders took care to avoid using the word infantry. These 
troops were formed into 'rifle brigades' and rifle divi¬ 
sions' using the word strelkovy, deriving from strelok 
'riflemen', which could be translated as sharpshooter. 
The term infantry (pychota) was employed by the Soviets 
only as the general designation of the arm, as distinct 
OO 
from artillery and cavalry, etc. 
Trotsky abolished the expressions 'officer' and 
'other rank', and in fact all distinguishing ranks and 
insignias were abrogated. In theory all were equal now, 
addressing each other as 'Comrade',29 
In the cavalry, the former NCO's took over much more 
important positions than in the other arms. The commands 
in the cavalry were predominantly occupied by the former 
NCO's over or even privates of the old army. The Red 
cavalry was recruited largely from volunteers, and included 
a large proportion of the more active and warlike elements 
of the Red forces.3® 
The practice of merely giving a soldier a gun without 
2^Michel Garder, A History of the Soviet Army 
(London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 35. 
28Ibid. 
290'Ballance, Red Army, p. 40. 
30White, Red Army, p. 55 
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training was abandoned by the Red Army. Trotsky wrote 
that universal training is designed to equip the individual 
soldier and also the whole unit with greater familiarity 
in all methods of manoeuvring, shooting, and military 
practices.3! 
The Red Army inherited from the old regime buildings, 
material, organized bodies of cadets with their instructing 
personnel.33 With the facilities the Red Army received 
from the old regime, they began to train their cadets—who 
would eventually replace the officers of the old army and 
the NCO's thus putting the second part of Trotsky's plan 
into effect. 
The state of affairs which existed in the old army 
schools after the revolution and during the Red Guard 
period continued until the end of 1918. The Command 
Courses were in practice self-governing bodies, with 
Soviets and committees of cadets exercising authority over 
the internal discipline of their respective schools. 
The primary objective during this period was placed on 
discipline. 
The Soviet Government devised a plan which provided 
for three types of military educational institutions. The 
schools of the lower type (First Step) were to be preceded 
•S^Trotsky, "Communist Party," p. 311. 
33White, Red Army, p. 56. citing D. A. Petrovskii, 
Voennals shkola v gody Revoluitii, Moscow, 1924. 
33Ibid. 
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by the middle type schools (Second Step) and the education 
was to be completed at the Third Step or military colleges, 
where the education of the commanders of the Red Army was 
to receive the final touches.34 
The First Step schools had for their end a 
complete practical training for the lowest officer 
posts (platoon commander), as well as a practical 
acquaintanceship with the duties of the next command 
(company commander). It was planned that regardless 
of the arm in which the young cadet was to serve 
upon graduation, he was supposed to acquire a general 
understanding 1about war and the forces working in 
it.' The First Step schools were planned to train 
officers for one arm of the service only. Some were 
thus designated to educate infantry officers, other 
cavalry, and still other artillery. 
The Second Step schools were to provide the 
means of perfecting their students in all phases of 
military science necessary for the efficient direc¬ 
tion of detachments comprising the three arms— 
infantry, cavalry and artillery—as well as to 
enable them to direct the operations of such 
detachments in practice. 
The Third Step schools—Akademii or Military 
Colleges, such as the War College, the Artillery 
College, the Engineers' College, etc.—were to 
prepare highly trained specialists in their respec¬ 
tive fields of military science and art.3^ 
The Command Courses continued to multiply and existed 
until two years after the Civil War. During the Civil War, 
(1918-1920), 39,914 cadets graduated from Command Courses.3® 
In June 1920, there came into existence a higher type 
* of Command Courses. These new courses required twelve 
34White, Red Army, p. 58 
3®White, Red Army, p. 58, citing Petrovskii, Voennals 
shkola v gody Revoluitii, Moscow, 1924, p. 26. 
3®White, Red Army, p. 58, citing Grazhdanskaia Voina, 
1918-1921, II, p. 96. This figure includes 1897 graduates 
of the so-called "higher" (vysshie) schools. 
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months of training. Some of these schools were reorganized 
into normal military schools as provided by the plan.37 
Most of the cadets entering the military schools 
during the Civil War period did so without any party 
affiliations; but by the time they had completed their 
training they had become members of the Communist Party, 
as a result of Trotsky's thorough indoctrination technic. 
The instructors in the military schools were mostly 
old tsarist military instructors, they failed to relate 
to the cadets the type of warfare being used by those 
fighting in the Civil War, instead of trying to relate the 
classroom warfare methods with those strategies actually 
in use on the battlefield. D. Petrovskii, Director of 
Military Education of the Red Army, admits that the Red 
commanders promoted during the Civil War were for all 
practical purposes merely well-trained private soldiers 
with a well-developed sense of duty.38 
The commissars of the courses were a very important 
factor in the functioning of the schools. They had a 
threefold duty: to serve as a check upon the anti-Bol- 
shevik elements among the instructors and cadets, to 
guide the Red element, and to provide the impulse and the 
enthusiam for the day-by-day life of the courses.38 
37White, Red Army, p. 59, citing Petrovskii, Voennals 
shkola, p. 18. 
38White, Red Army, p. 59, citing Petrovskii, Voennals 
shkola. p. 58. 
38White, Red Army, p. 59, citing Petrovskii, Voennals 
shkola, p. 12. 
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During the Civil War both sides made use of armoured 
cars, homemade and otherwise, tanks were rarely used as 
were airplanes. No new revolutionary form of warfare was 
evolved and perfected. 
The Soviet Government's power of requisitioning 
helped to provide the army with the necessary materials 
they needed to continue fighting. Of course, the actual 
material resources were slight in comparision with the 
needs of the army, but they were constantly being replen¬ 
ished.^0 There is no accurate account on exactly how much 
money was allocated to the Red Army; however, it is safe 
to assume that a substantial proportion of the Gross 
National Product was invested into the military during 
the Civil War. 
^°Irving Howe, ed., The Basic Writings of Trotsky 
(New York: Random House, 1963), p. 112. 
CHAPTER II 
TROTSKY AND THE TRAIN 
The train was Trotsky's mobile headquarters, it 
served several functions—military, political and social. 
The train became a legend during the Civil War. With the 
aid of the train Trotsky turned up whenever the situation 
on the front appeared critical. Trotsky referred to the 
train as that vital shoveful of coal that keeps a dying 
fire alive.4^ it carried a printing press and signalling 
equipment which included a radio transmitter for direct 
contact with Moscow; a small number of hand-picked officers 
capable of organizing new formations on the spot or taking 
over from commanders who had proved unequal to their task. 
The train also carried tobacco, boots, motor-cars and 
various comforts for the troops.42 
Trotsky did not actively participate in the battles 
occurring during the period of 1918 to 1922, but he along 
with his assistants helped plan the military strategy of 
the war. Trotsky helped to boost the sometimes sagging 
morale of the Red soldiers by his appearance on the battle¬ 
field. Often Trotsky was called to the battlefield when a 




general or commander deserted his post. Trotsky was lavish 
in praise for those who distinguished themselves by courage 
and talent but dealt implacably with those who failed in 
their duties. On one occasion Trotsky brought before a 
court martial the commander and the commissar of a regi¬ 
ment, who at the height of the battle had taken themselves 
and their men away from the front line. Trotsky commented 
on the event. "The soldiers of the Red Army are neither 
cowards nor scoundrels." He felt that it was their duty 
to fight for the freedom of the working class.43 If they 
failed in this their fight, commanders and commissars were 
equally guilty. Trotsky issued a warning: if any detach¬ 
ment retreats without orders, the first to be shot will be 
the commissar and next the commander. Cowards, scoundrels 
and traitors would not escape the bullet—for this Trotsky 
vouched before the whole Red Army.44 
Trotsky had many conflicts with part leaders on some 
of the methods he employed during the Civil War period. 
One of the most famous occurred at the town of Tsaritsin 
(now Volgograd) when Stalin, who had been sent to Tsaritsin 
as senior political commissar ordered the removal of the 
former Tsarist officers serving in the Red Army and 
replaced them with Communists. Trotsky, incensed at this 
challenge to his authority, demanded and obtained from 
43Deutscher, Prophet Armed, p. 420. 
44Deutscher, Prophet Armed, p. 421, citing Trotsky, 
Kak Vooruzhalas Revolutsia. Moscow, 1923-1925, I, p. 235. 
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Lenin the transfer of Stalin to the Ukraine.45 This was 
only one out of a series of events that showed the hostil¬ 
ity between Stalin and Trotsky. Hostility also existed 
between Trotsky and the Politiburo and some friction 
occurred between Trotsky and Lenin. 
During the period of 1918 to 1922 while the Red Army 
was engaged in a Civil War as well as a war with Poland, 
the train served as Trotsky's headquarters. From this 
legendary office on wheels came the orders which enabled 
the Red Army to defeat the White Army and the Poles. It 
was aboard the train that Trotsky made the decision to 
neglect the Crimea and concentrate his forces on the 
recovery of the Donets basin, hot-beds of a counterrevolu¬ 
tion in the rich region of the Don and the Kuban as well 
as the rest of the Caucasus. For this decision Trotsky 
was severly criticized by Soviet military writers and 
Stalin. Trotsky was determined not to commit the same 
mistake as his adversaries in the summer of 1919 by 
dispersing his forces in a manoeuvre of too great a 
scope.46 Trotsky issued commands that helped to win for 
the Bolsheviki land formerly possessed by the White forces, 
as in the case of the passes over the Ural Mountains which 
led to a general White retreat into Siberia.47 He also 
- issued commands that had a direct effect on the soldiers 
45Hart, Red Army, p. 37. 
45Garder, Soviet Army, p. 44. 
47 Hart, Red Army, p. 41 
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of the Red Army. Whenever a deserter failed to return to 
his unit within twenty days his family was held responsible 
and their property was seized.4® Trotsky asserted a 
strategy in Russia known as the global strategy "which was 
that, not the tool of a policy of force but, the essential 
mainstay of a policy."4® In keeping with this policy 
Trotsky ordered that with every Red Army unit in action a 
police cordon follow whose task was to shoot down any man 
trying to slip away. These techniques Trotsky admits were 
not the ones he would have preferred using but he said he 
was compelled to employ them to insure a Bolshevik victory. 
Trotsky was not always issuing orders that would punish, 
he asked that the government establish medals for braverySO 
to give those soldiers who had done meritorious work. 
Trotsky made several trips to the front to see the 
men and find out about their needs. Aboard the train 
Trotsky had a direct wire to Moscow where he could send 
his messages for immediate supply needs. After visiting 
the front and other battle areas he would hold a conference 
in the staff car or the dining car, inviting as many 
representatives as possible, including those from the 
lower commanding force and from the ranks, aswell as from 
the local party organizations, the Soviets' administration 
and the trade unions. Trotsky claimed by having so many 
48Ibid., p. 48. 
4®Garder, Soviet Army, p. 159. 
5®Deutscher, Prophet Armed, p. 421. 
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representatives he got a picture of the situation that was 
neither false nor highly colored.51 These conferences 
always showed some practical results. Trotsky once com¬ 
mented that no matter how poor the organs of the local 
administration might have been, they always managed to cut 
down some of their own needs to contribute something to 
the army. 
Trotsky was able to let people in the towns who had 
no link with the outside world know what was occurring in 
their country as well as the world. This was accomplished 
by having telegraphic reports published in the train news¬ 
paper and given out as the train went through hamlets. 
The train had a wireless aerial over a particular car in 
the train, so that they could receive radio messages from 
the Eiffel Tower, from Nauen, and from other stations, 
thirteen in all, with Moscow the foremost.52 A stock of 
telephone apparatus and wires was kept aboard the train 
which were given out to the regiments and divisions that 
were previously cut off from the rest of the world. 
Although the Red Army's supplies were limited and 
at some points non-existent, the train carried tobacco, 
boots, motor-cars, leather jackets, medicaments, machine 
guns, field glasses, maps, watches and all sort of gifts 
for the fighting men of the Red Army. Along with these 
s'upplies, the train carried a ray of hope for soldiers 
51-Howe, Writings of Trotsky, p. 113. 
Ibid., p. 115. 
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who had lost all hope. The mere presence of the train 
boosted the soldiers' morale. Commanders would consider 
the train's effect on the men the same way it would be if 
they were told that a division of reserves was coming.53 
Part of the train was a huge garage holding several 
automobiles and a gasoline tank. This enabled Trotsky and 
his advisors to travel away from the railroad lines such 
as when inspecting and visiting troops. Trotsky always 
kept a squad of picked sharpshooters and machine gunners, 
amounting to twenty to thirty men, who occupied the trucks 
and light cars. A number of hand machine guns were also 
placed in Trotsky's car in case he ran into a band of 
Cossacks. 
The train was also a fighting institution on wheels. 
Trotsky often said it was more like an armoured train than 
a headquarters on wheels. In fact, it was armoured, or at 
least its engines and machine gun cars were armour covered. 
All the crew could handle arms. The crew all wore leather 
uniforms with a large metal badge on the left arm, just 
below the shoulders. The cars of the train were connected 
by telephone and by a system of signals. To assure that 
the men were alert while traveling, Trotsky had frequent 
alarms sounded, both night and day so the men would be 
prepared at all times. Armed detachments would be put off 
the train as 'landing parties.' The appearance of the 
landing parties behind the firing line gave strength to 
53Ibid.. p. 117. 
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the nervous units and acted as a scare tactic against the 
enemy. 
The train was sometimes cut off and shelled or bombed 
from the air. Just as the train earned respect from the 
Reds it acquired hatred from its enemies. At the trial 
of Semyonov, a Social Revolutionary, was told a story on 
how he took part in the preparation to wreck the train. 
One one occasion the train was derailed and wrecked, at 
the station of Gorke but it was soon repaired. 
From the end of 1919 Trotsky devoted only a minor 
part of his attention to military affairs. Trotsky felt 
that the issue of the Civil War was no longer in doubt.54 
In the middle of November 1920, some 135,000 soldiers and 
civilians left Russia for points unknown. The White cause 
was lost and the Civil War had become history. 
The Ninth Party Congress held in 1920, approved the 
transformation of the Red Army into a militia of the 
territorial type. The Party enforced a compromise plan 
under which it retained a cadre army of 560,000 men while 
the rest of the army gradually was replaced by the terri¬ 
torial militia structure.55 This compromise was similar 
to the one in 1918, when the Red Army of Workers and 
Peasants was formed. This plan did not satisfy Trotsky 
because it would not let him carry out his proposed plan 
for the military organization he was seeking to build. 
54Deutscher, Prophet Armed, p. 487. 
^Kolkowicz, soviet Military, p. 44. 
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Because the Party members feared a strong military man 
eventually taking over the government the Revolutionary 
Military Council (RMC) was retained after the Civil War. 
Trotsky nevertheless accepted the plan because he realized 
that a cavalry would be maintained with this territorial 
militia. The success of the Red Army's cavalry in both 
the Civil War and the Polish War indicated to Trotsky 
that there was a need for a large contingent of cavalry 
in any Russian army. The cavalry was essential because 
twice every year the ground was rendered impassable to 
vehicles by the spring thaw and rains and the autumn rains. 
With the Russo-Polish War beginning in 1920 the talk 
of a territorial type militia subsided. The Poles were 
dissatisfied with the appointed eastern border by the 
Versailles Treaty, September 1919, which laid down a 
temporary line of demarcation, the Curzon Line. The Poles 
aspired the frontier of the ancient kingdom of Poland, 
before the 1772 Partition, which comprised parts of White 
Russia and the Ukraine.56 The Poles, led by a veteran 
anti-Russian fighter, Joseph Pilsudski, entered into a 
close political agreement with the Ukrainian anti-Russian 
forces.5^ Pilsudski and Wrangel attacked the Reds simul¬ 
taneously causing the Red Army to divide its forces. The 
Russians were aroused by a wave of religious, national and 
56Hart, Red Army, p. 45. 
^Basil Dmytryshyn, USSR A Concise History (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), p. 100. 
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social sentiment against the Poles when they advanced 
into the Ukraine. The Bolshevik appeal to all Russians 
to defend 'Mother Russia* fell on responsive ears. After 
several battles an armistice was signed October 12, 1920, 
and later followed by the Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921 
which brought to an end the Russo-Polish War. 
One of Trotsky's last tasks during the period of 1918 
to 1922 was to put down a revolt of the Kronstadt sailors. 
The Kronstadt sailors had supported the Bolshevik govern¬ 
ment as opposed to the Provisional Government. The 
Kronstadt rebellion was ignited by a series of strikes and 
demonstrations in Petrograd early in 1921 because of a 
food shortage and administrative overcentralization. 
The Kronstadt sailors, renowned for their revolutionary 
zeal, sympathized with the strikers and supported their 
cause. The crew of the battleship Petropavlovsk, adopted 
a platform, February 28, 1921. "The platform called for 
immediate re-election of the Soviets by free and secret 
ballot. It demanded freedom of speech, press and assembly 
for workers and peasants and for their political parties. 
It insisted that all political prisoners be released and 
that the privileged position of the Communist Party and 
its armed detachments be abolished.The platform 
promised the peasants the privilege of doing what they 
pleased with their land, and advocated the ending of 
58Ibid.. p. 116. 
59Ibid., pp. 116-117. 
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discrimination in food rationing. In March 1921 about 
60,000 of the sailors marched on Petrograd against the 
Bolshevik dictatorship to incite the workers to join 
them.60 
Sensing the danger, the authorities sent to Kronstadt 
Mikhail I. Kalinin, Chairman of the Central Executive 
Committee of the Soviet. Kalinin was chosen because of 
his peasant background, it was hoped that because of this 
factor he would be able to acquire a better rapport with 
the men than would one of the ex-tsarist officers. 
Kalinin's attempt was futile. 
On March 2, 1921 the defiant sailors set up a Pro¬ 
visional Revolutionary Committee, which they selected from 
among themselves. The government requested the Committee 
to surrender peacefully. The Committee feeling that 
justice was on their side refused and failed to strengthen 
its position, which was to later prove to be one of the 
causes for their defeat. The sailors had hoped for a 
revolt of the workers in the urban areas to materialize 
thus causing the Red Army to divide its forces but to 
the misfortune of the sailors it did not. 
Government forces directed by Trotsky and led by 
Tukhachevsky began vigorous preparation for an assuit 
which took place on the eighteenth of March. Tukhachevsky 
discussed the possibility of using gas shells and balloons 
during the Kronstadt Rebellion, gas shells and balloons 
6®o'Ballance, Red Army, p. 90. 
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were actually brought up for the purpose from Petrograd.61 
Trotsky along with a few other Party members outlawed the 
use of gas warfare on the sailors but had they had to 
attempt a second time to reduce the rebels, gas would have 
been used in all probability. Tukhachevsky took his most 
reliable troops, together with a portion of Red Army cadres 
and men on the short 'commanders' courses,' which amounted 
in all to approximately 60,000. The Red soldiers drove the 
rebels from the outskirts of Petrograd causing the sailors 
to fall back on their forts and ships at Kronstadt. 
Tukhachevsky's men along with some 140 delegates to the 
Tenth Party Congress bombarded the streets of Kronstadt 
in which the sailor's families lived and then turned their 
guns on the forts and ships. This all-out assault was 
resisted by the sailors. Tukhachevsky was suddenly forced 
to break off action because some of his troops refused to 
fight, leaving the sailors secure and defiant in their 
position. 
Alarmed, Trotsky came from Moscow to personally 
direct the assault. Trotsky employed extreme measures to 
restore the situation. One out of every five men of the 
Red Army units that refused to fight was shot. Tukhachevsky 
resumed fighting and by March 18, the Red Army had success¬ 
fully beaten the mutineers. A ghastly bloodbath ensued 
resulting in some fifteen thousand sailors, who had sur¬ 
rendered, being massacred without trial. 
61 Ibid.. p. 106. 
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Trotsky and the Red Army of Workers and Peasants 
accomplished many things, the settling of the Civil War, 
the Russo-Polish War and the Kronstadt revolt were three 
of the most important of these accomplishments between 
1918 to 1922. 
CHAPTER III 
SUMMARY 
Leon Trotsky is a man that evokes several emotions— 
admiration, contempt and pity. 
Trotsky is deserving of admiration for the manner in 
which he built the Red Army of Workers and Peasants. When 
he was given the position of Commissar of War, in 1918, 
Trotsky knew nothing of organizing, training and disciplin¬ 
ing an army other than what he had read. Trotsky had had 
no practical military experience and because of this factor 
he had to rely heavily on ex-tsarist officers, which he 
secured voluntarily or by force. Trotsky realized that 
the service of these military specialists could not always 
be trusted, adopted and expended a procedure used by the 
French, the assigning of political commissars to officers. 
The French had merely assigned these political commissars 
to high ranking officials, Trotsky assigned them to all 
officers. 
Contempt can be felt for Trotsky when one reads of 
the methods in which he used to secure officers and insure 
their loyalty, such as holding their families hostage. 
The use of police cordons and the ruthlessness of the 
armed detachments further adds to the contempt one could 
feel for Trotsky. Trotsky tried to establish a conventional 
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army in time of war, World War I and the Civil War, by employing 
unconventional type means—terror. Trotsky in some of his later 
writing apologizes for his use of such harsh methods but justifies 
them by saying they were employed to make the Bolshevik cause 
victorious. 
Pity can be felt for Trotsky because he devoted himself 
to the Bolshevik cause only to later be underminded, stripped of 
his party membership, exiled and later assassinated. Trotsky had 
devoted much of his time and talents to building the Red Amy. 
Trotsky's ruthlessness can not be overlooked or completely justified 
but a partial justification could be that he was working to the best 




Trotsky deserves the title, "Father of the Red Army" 
because it was through his leadership along with his 
'military specialists' that the Russian Army of today 
first began. Trotsky's use of force in some instances 
and the abandoning of a volunteer army can be considered 
harsh and ruthless but one can also see that this method 
was necessary to insure the success of the young army. 
The Red Army of Workers and Peasants was created 
during a time of war, World War I and forced to prove 
itself in the Russian Civil War, Russo-Polish War and 
the Kronstadt Rebellion. The Russian Army did not begin 
with a modern technology and weapons to assist them or a 
corps of well organized and disciplined men, but they did 
commence with a group of men, who believed in the Bolshevik 
cause and were prepared to die to defend it. Because the 
army was small, Trotsky abandoned the volunteer army for 
one in which conscription was utilized to secure the 
necessary fighting men. The men did not go through a 
long and extensive training period because the army was 
created in 1918 and the Civil War began in the same year. 
The Red Army under Trotsky's direction showed to the 
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world the ability of an infant regime to establish an 
effective military force. The military force was to be 
used in securing internal peace as well as defending 
itself from external enemies. The manner in which the 
Red Army under Trotsky's guidance expelled the threats 
brought on by the Civil War, the Russo-Polish War and the 
Kronstadt Rebellion showed the world that Russia was now 
much more than merely willing to defend her cause but 
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